One issue that surfaces with regularity in studies on the problem of organic generation in the early modem period is the battle waged between preexis tence theorists and advocates of epigenesis. Roughly, by preexistence, I mean the theory that, at the Creation, God preformed (to some degree at least) every living organism that would ever exist.' One especially distinct form of preexistence is the embottement theory, according to which each organic indi vidual is encased within the reproductive organs of one of its parents (either the mother on the ovist theory or the father on the spermist or animalculist the ory), its parent is encased within the reproductive organs of one of its parents, and so forth. This accounts for all organic individuals of every generation all future members of a given species are found encased within the first member of that species upon creation. And roughly, by epigenesis, I mean the theory that posits a truly new development of organic form.^ Upon coitus, matter ' I use the term "preexistence" to differentiate this theory from preformation. As Jacques Roger and Peter Bowler have both noted, there are two distinct theories to be considered, one of which specifies God as the creator of organic forms, and the other of which simply states that the organism is formed before conception, but by a natural agent (Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in EighteenthCentury French Thought, trans.
The debate surrounding organic generation between the Swiss poet, botanist, anatomist, and politician Albrecht von Haller (170777) and the German doctor and professor of anatomy and physiology Caspar Friedrich Wolff (173494) is often considered a clsKsic version of the preexistence epigenesis debate in the eighteenth century. The crucial details of that debate as it is generally understood are as follows. Early in his career, Haller wavered on whether to accept preexistence or epigenesis, initially supporting animal culist preexistence, as had his teacher Boerhaave, then converting to epigen esis in order to account for experiments in grafting and the recent discovery that polyps regenerate themselves when severed^ and his own observations that organic parts appear to develop gradually. He eventually lost faith in epigenesis at least in part due to his own extensive experiments on chicken eggs at various stages of their development, which convinced him that certain organic parts are preformed in the egg. Moreover, he believed that the func tional organization of living beings seems to require an intelligent builder absent in epigenesis but most certainly present in preexistence, given that God is responsible for organifc formation on that theory.^ In his late work Elementa physiologiae corporis humani (hereafter Elementa), he notes that while a snowflake could be produced by forces alone, an organism must be produced by forces and wisdom (EP 8:1178). In his 1758 Sur la formation du coeur dans le poulet (hereafter Formation), Haller writes in support of preexistence:
It seems to me very probable that, at all times, the essential parts of the fetus exist formed; true, not in the way that they appear in the adult animal they are arranged in a way that allows certain prepared causes to hasten the growth of some of the parts, to delay the growth of other parts, to change positions, to render organs that were transparent visible, to give consistency to the fluid and mucous, and thus to end up forming an animal that is very different from the embryo, and yet in which there is no part that did not essentially exist in the embryo. (Haller 1758, 2:186; cf. EP 8:1489)
And in his Elementa, he explicitly identifies God as the creator of organisms and the mother as the parent who hosts the germ (EP 8:143)."'
In 1759, one year after the publication of Haller's Formation, Wolff pub lished his dissertation, Theoria generationis, in which he defends an epi genetic account of generation according to which plant and animal fluids are secreted from the developing organism and are solidified into parts. The process of secretionand solidification is accomplished by means of the vis essentialis. Just as this force accounts for the absorption of nutrients from the earth and the distribution of them throughout plants in both generatiort and selfmaintenance, so too is it responsible for the development of animal bod ies during generation: "At the start of its development, the chicken embryo takes food from the substance of the egg. It is absorbed by a force that is not the heart's contraction, and neither the arteries nor the pressure caused by them in the neighboring veins nor their compressions by the activity of muscles-This force is called the vis essentialis" in animals just as it is in plants (Wolff 1759, §168, 73 In her impressive study of the dispute, Shirley Roe indicates that the HallerWolff controversy is especially interesting because they interpret so differently the apparently shared observational data culled from their dissec tion of chickens during their formation and development.® Two points stand out from their dispute over the meaning of the evidence. First, Haller attributes the phenomenon of the gradual formation of parts to the transparency of those parts before they grow and gain the solidity which makes them visible, while Wolff attributes this phenomenon to the prior nonexistence of those parts. Sec ond, Haller responds to the fact that the heart appears later than other organs by attributing this to its tiny size and, again, transparency, while, once again, Wolff attributes this phenomenon to the prior nonexistence of the heart. It is crucial for Haller to suppose the preexistence of the heart because he takes the stimulation of this organ by the semen as that which starts the heartbeat, and the heartbeat is that which starts the circulation of fluid through the transpar ent, collapsed body, thus bringing it to life and to a visible state. What might account for Haller's and Wolff's divergence on the issue of generation in light of the shared empirical data? Roe's approach is to turn to "a whole host of 'extrascientific' assumptions and expectations, which fundamentally colored the observational level of their debate."'® She sketches three broad areas of disagreement between the two which together account for their different the ories of generation. First, she claims that Haller holds a "mechanical view of physiological explanations" (90), while Wolff holds a view of nature closer to vitalism and does not believe that a reduction of life phenomena to mechanism are the theories of preexistence and epigenesis, and are they so clearly distinct and mutually exclusive as they are often portrayed to be? Frederick B. Churchill is surely right to note that in discussing this "awkward dichotomy" between preexistence and epigenesis, "a thorough analysis must tangle with those intractable questions about the meaning of 'novelty,' 'emergence,' 'comingtobe,' and 'form.'"'^ In fact, some commentators have questioned (implicitly or explicitly) the strict divi sion of these theories. Marjorie Grene and David Depew argue that Buffon's theory of generation, based on the hypotheses of organic molecules and the " On this score. Roe is in line with many commentators who have interpreted the preexistence epigenesis debate as a debate between mechanism and vitalism. According to this account, with the rise of mechanism, organic generation became impossible to explain, and so it was explained away by saying that God created all organic beings. While mechanism could explain organic growth, it could not explain organic generation. If one wishes to explain generation by appeal to epigenesis, then one had to abandon mechanism for vitalism so as to be able to explain organic formation. On one understanding, preexistence simply cannot be considered ki expla nation of generation because it transforms what ought to be explained nat urally into a supernatural event.'® Wolff himself believes that preexistence cannot be taken as an explanation of generation because it in fact denies generation (Wolff 1759, Expositio et ratio instituti, §3, 5). But under one common understanding of preexistence,^® the theory comes about because it seems that generation could not be explained any other way given the premise of the mechanical philosophy. Descarte's own theory, according to which organic forms would emerge part after part from bits of matter moving according to the laws of nature, establishes the extreme improbability of an epigenetic account within the confines of a nascent mechanism. Given that there is no possible natural explanation of generation (according to the present interpretation), generation could occur only by God's forming each organic individual. So in the case of generation, turning to the supematiural provides, in fact, a true account of the origin of organic beings and to this extent actually explains how they come to be. Thus, the sequential emergence of parts from undifferentiated material may be an accurate description of what we can see during fetal formation, but we cannot conceive how the finished product could ever arise from matter in motion, and so epigenesis can be only a description of events seen, not an explanation of how they actually occur.
Wolff himself believes that in positing the twin suppositions of secretion solidification and the vis essentialis, he is providing an explanation and not a mere description of an epigenetic generation theory because these two prin ciples are the sufficient reason for generation (Wolff 1759, §242, 115). He draws upon a distinction adopted from Christian Wolff between historical and philosophical knowledge (a third kind of knowledge, mathematical, is not salient to the current discussion). Historical knowledge merely lays out the facts, and in the case of generation it simply provides a description of changing appearances of the developing fetus. Philosophical knowledge pro vides an explanation for the changing appearances, and it does so by providing the sufficient reasons fpr the appearances ( § §57,5). Wolff believes that, with the exception of Descartes before him (to be dealt with in the next section), no one had provided a sufficient reason to explain the phenomena of generation. But by positing the vis essentialis acting along with the secretion and solidifi cation of nutritive fluids, he believes that he has provided a proper explanation ( §242, 115) and that he has thus produced philosophical knowledge.^' While Wolff is justified in this claim, it is not prima facie clear why he is justified, and a proper account of this justification will be given in section 4. At this juncture, however, one may argue against Wolff's assertion that he has produced philosophical knowledge by pointing out that, while he has identified sufficient reasons for the emergence of organized form, he has left these reasons themselves entirely unexplained. The process of secretion and solidification of parts (one of two sufficient reasons identified by Wolff) is a mere description of the phenomena seen, namely, the fact that from "budding points" in plants, for example, globules of fluid are secreted and then gradually solidify into organic structures. The second of Wolff's sufficient reasons for generation is the vis essentialis, the force which is responsible for the secretionsolidification process unfolding as it does. The vis essentialis is meant to be the cause that brings about the effects experienced in generation. His denial that the heart is preformed is crucial for his theory because without a beating heart some other principle must be identified as the efficient cause of fetal development, thus encouraging the supposition that the vis essentialis is that principle (Wolff 1759, § §1678, 723). Yet one might argue that it is unclear in his early works that this "cause" is anything other than a name that stands for the described progression of organic formation. This suspicion is vindipated by Wolff's discussion of the vis essentialis in a late essay intended to deflect criticisms of his reliance upon it: Yet once Wolff admits that the supposed "sufficient reason" of the vis essen tialis (which was meant to explain why organic development proceeds as it does) can be eliminated from our "explanations" and that we would still depict the production and formation of the organic parts exactly as \ve do when supposing the existence of the vis essentialis, the explanatory worth of the Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation, 1035 concept is thrown into doubt. So it seems (1) that this "sufficient reason" does not provide much of an explanation at all but rather is an unexplained cause named as the reason for why generation proceeds as observed and described and (2) that it is the accurate description of effects that matters.
One way of bolstering the interpretation that Wolff's epigenesis is merely descriptive while also showing the divergence of Haller and Wolff in their theories of generation is to pay regard to the use each makes of forces in their theories of generation. Newton had a clear impact on the life sciences in the eigliteenth century, and this is certainly true in the cases of both Haller and Wolff. As Thomas Hall points out, physiologists consciously adopted Newtonian paradigms to their own investigations of living beings. Hall calls these "physiological unknowns" or the "inexplicable explicative devices" used to explain organic phenomena which, like Newton's gravity, may be unknown as causes'but are well known by their constant and predictable effects.^^ There are two elements to this adoption of forces. First, ontologi cally, life scientists appeal to forces as calises that explain the effects studied. And second, epistemically and methodologically, we do not know what the natures of these causes are, but we can still rely upon them in our explanations because we can study the actions of the causes and thus the effects they bring The results of all these experiments have given place to a new division of the parts of the human body... by distinguishing those which are susceptible of Irritability and Sensibility,from those which are not (6578).
These multiple experiments lead Haller to the conclusion that the forces of irritability and sensibility surely exist we witness the actions and effects of them even though we are no more familiar with the nature of these forces than we are familiar with the nature of gravity (692). The force of nntability is useful for Haller, as he employs it to explain the onset of fetal growth on a preexistence theory. Given that the heart is the most irritable of all muscles (6868), it is the first to be stimulated by the inherent irritability of the semen when the semen contacts the embryo in the uterus upon coitus. This starts the beating of the heart, the life of the fetus, and the filling out of shriveled and transparent but preexisting body parts.
Haller's force of nritability is somewhat akin to Newtonian gravity. Cer tainly, epistemically and methodologically it is precisely Newtonian, and Haller claims exactly this. We do not know its nature as cause, but we know it by its effects. Those effects are simple in that they are a single type of motion -the effect is simply to contract. While Haller advocates a suspen sion of judgment on the nature of forces, he does not suggest a suspension of research upon them.^ Haller is also not averse to allowing that organic actions, including the effects of irritability, may well one day be subject to cal culation.^^ But ontologically Haller's forces, both irritability and sensibility, are somewhat different from Newtonian gravity in that the latter is universal but the former are confined to specific sorts of organic parts within an already organize^ body.^® The importance of this departure from Newton wiU come clear in due course. Wolff also relies upon the concept of force his vis essentialis throughout his discussion of the generation of living beings (animals and plants) and their selfmaintenance (plants). His force is also akin to Newton's force of gravity epistemically in the sense that we cannot know its nature, but its existence as a cause of living processes is clear to us due to the regular effects it brings about: "It suffices that we know it is there, and to identify it by its effects, as it is required purely and simply so as to explain the development of parts" (Wolff 1764,160) 
through epigenesis. This is because of the Newtonian epistemology that grounds his theory of the vis essentialis: we may not know what the force is as a cause we may not know what its nature is and how it accomplishes what it
accomplishes but we know that it exists by studying the effects that it surely does have, such as the process of generation. Yet studying these effects seems to amount to no more than describing the constant and regular sequential development of parts, a development not even subject to calculation. Contrast this with Haller's approach, which admittedly starts with a description of the effects of living forces. But because these forces are simple and linear, they cannot satisfactorily explain generation. Only God, believes Haller, is up to the task, and so acknovvledging the truth of God's role in generation is an accurate explanation of that process. It is more than mere description.
The conclusion that Wolff describes but does not explain generation through his thebry of epigenesis is encouraged by his later works. In his 1789 paper Von der eigenthiimlichen und wesentlichen Kraft der vegetabilis chen sowohl als auch der animalischen Substanz, Wolff writes that "through this present treatise, this essential force, which I posited at that time [in ear lier works] as the foundation which I also proved existed, but which I in no way explained, now will be explained" (50n). In doing so, he contrasts his vis essentialis with Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb, or formative power, since the vis essentialis "exists imiothing further than a particularly defined kind of attractive and repulsive force" which draws like substances together and drives unlike substances apart (42).^" Not only is the vis essentialis not to be equated with the soul, but it is not to be understood as selective and purpo sive, capable of accomplishing different things from moment to moment, as Blumenbach's force would seem to do. This is because there would be no suf ficient reason why it would act in these different ways precisely as it does and in no other way (66n). Wolff thus echos Haller's own earlier stated concern regarding the vis essentialis. there is no reason why a hen should produce a chicken while a peacock produces a peacock (EP 8:117). Wolff concludes that the principle of sufficient reason, as he understands it, requires that we reject the idea of a purposeful, determining building force that can produce myriad effects because there would be no necessary connection between such a force and its actual very precise effects. Because there is no necessary connection, in reality it should thus be unpredictable m what it does (Wolff 1759, 67). In his criticism of Blumenbach, and in his definition of the vis essentialis as a nonselective attractive or repulsive force, Wolff places himself squarely in which determines species is passed from generation to generation, from parent to offspring, while no organic structure is so transmitted because the species consists in the cause of the structure (and that cause is the qualified vegetable matter); the species does not consist in the structure itself:
[I]n vegetation and generation theije exists something that is associated with the specific structure observed, apd the basis of this structure. The latter aU that could be called the inner is'hidden from us-Only this is transmitted from the parents to the offspring by way of generation; the former [the specific structure] emerges in the offspring as the result of that which is transmitted. (Wolff 1973,155; Margarete Hochdoerfer believes that Haller maintains a basic belief in the divine order of the universe, whether that order is expressed in terms of preexisting geims formed directly by God or laws of epigenesis that will produce organic order (The Conflict between the Religious and will not, however, be the last word on the role played by God in these two naturalists' theories.
So Wolff abandons the theory of epigenesis as he had previously under stood it. Once he queries the way in which the vis essentialis operates, and concludes that it is simple, nonselective force, he posits a variety of spe cial substances created by God and passed from generation to generation in order to explain the results of generation. Once Wolff turns from describing the process of generation to explaining how this process is brought about, he moves decisively in the direction of preexistence in the sense that he turns to God's having predetermined to a considerable degree the matter of generation. Moreover, Haller's belief, as one example, that the preexisting structure created by God is merely an organized fluid that, upon conception, develops boundaries and a consistency that can resist pressure (Haller 1758, 2:175) indicates the strong epigenetic elements to be found in his theory: there is, in an anatomically significant sense, notable organic development. If the preexistenceepigenesis divide is to be meaningfully retained in the case of Haller and Wolff, we must provide a more careful explication of the distinction between the two theories than has thus far been given.
HALLER AND WOLFF ON DESCARTES
Roe is surely correct when she writes.
Admittedly, embryos on Wolff's theory do not start out in a state of absolute homogeneity. Yet one must be careful not to define epigenesis so narrowly that clearly epigenetic systems like Wolff's are excluded. Gradual development of complex heterogeneity from simple heterogeneity can provide a valid epigenetic viewpoint. In Wolff's system, the embryo's initial heterogeneity is pf a potential nature, based only on physical factors like solidification and attraction and repulsion, which produce the stiiictures of the orgahism through a gradual, but automatic, sequence of events. This is a far cry from preformation, especially in its eighteenthcentury emb'oitement form.^^
Haller insists that what God created and what ispassed on from^eneration to generation is a fairly qomplete structure of wellintegrated essential organs (EP 8:1489). Wolff emphatically denies th^t physical structure is what is passed from generation to generation since what is passed on the species is
the Scientific Views of Albrecht von Haller (17081777), 9). If she is right, then this would reinforce Wolff's point in his letter to Haller, that God need not work in the world by creating all organisms at the Creation in order to work providentially in the world. Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation, 147. 1973, 154) : "the thing which is, in the beginning, excreted from or produced by the maternal ovary is none other than the drop of liquid'located in the egg in which there is no structure similar to the structure of the parent" (Wolff 1973,149; trans. Gaissinovitch 1990,188) . So if we define, reasonably, preexistence as the passing on of the essential structure from generation to generation, and if we define epigenesis as the development of the essential structure where there was no such organic form before, even if the matter of generation is differentiated in a nonstructural way so as to necessitate a specific physical form, then the portrayal of Haller as preexistence theorist and Wolff as epigenesist holds.
simply a mode of vegetation (Wolff
But this, then, raises a crucial question. Why does Wolff posit matter that is somehow informed but not structurally formed, contrary to Haller's view? There ^e many viable answers to this Question, but the one I will pursue requires that we reconsider Wolff's earlier account of generation in order to determine why he thinks that it is an explanatory account of organic formation and development when it seems to be a mere description of the process. This brings us to the other fundamental issue of this essay: how experimental techniques, in the case of Haller and Wolff, condition the way they experience the data and consequently influence the theories of generation that they adopt. To set the stage for this work, I deal first with Haller's and Wolff's different reactions to Descartes in order to'clarify their epistemologies and thus their methodologies in natural investigations.
Haller is emphatic about the need to place experiment and observation above rational speculation and theory building. This should be clear by the fact of his extensive research on chicken eggs and his vivisections of 190 animals during his investigations into sensibility and irritability, a "species of cruelty for which [he] felt such a reluctance, as could only overcome by the desire of contributing to the benefit of mankind" (Haller [1752] 1963, 657). In the preface to the German translation of Buffon's first volume of the Histoire naturelle, he writes, "[M]ore convenient telescopes, rounder glass drops, more accurate divisions of the yardstick, syringes, and scalpels have contributed more to the enlargement of the domain of science than the cre ative spirit of Descartes, the father of classification, Aristotle, and the eru dite Gassendi" (Haller 1750, x) . Descartes, in Haller's estimation, misuses hypotheses because he starts from them rather than starting from observa tion and experiment. According to Haller, Descartes consequently speculates in the complete absence of empirical data. Haller is wrong, of course, that Descartes failed to conduct adequate experiments. In fact, Descartes is reluc tant to put pen to paper to tackle the problem of generation because he has not had enough opportunity to conduct enough experiments (AT 5:261), even though, in a letter to Mersenne of February 20,1639, he reports having spent eleven years doing dissections in order to further his knowledge (AT 2:525, CSMK 1345). Still, Haller is correct that rational theorizing comes first for Descartes in the sense that his theory of matter as extension is arrived at through the use of the pure intellect and that his matter theory sets limits upon any scientific explanation he can give of the empirical data.
Wolff, conversely, praises Descartes*. Descartes "showed what a proper explanation must look like, and he taught how one must philosophize" (Wolff 1764, 6). The reason Wolff thinks that Descarte's attempt at explanation is so successful is that he follows the method which Wolff lauds: the only clear demonstration is to prove that if laws and principles are assumed an organic body necessarily follows, or to show the sufficient connection between principles and laws and the generated organic body" (Wolff 1759,  § §67,5) . This is what Wolff believes he himself is doing when he posits the secretion and solidification of nutritive juices together with the vis essentialis as the sufficient reasons for the organic body. Descartes goes wrong, Wolff believes, in his theory, but at least he followed the correct method.
Roe takes Gerhard Rudolph, "La methode halI6rienne en physiologie," DixHuitieme Siecle 23 (1991): 78. Duchesneau alerts us to another element of Wolff's experimental demonstration that is not at odds with the depiction here (La physiologie des lumieres, 330). Wolff has a double scheme of demonstration, first providing an account of vegetation "in abstract," by laying out the order of generation in general according to the supposed law of epigenesis. Second, Wolff examines the question of generation in "inverse" order, by starting with an examination of the nutritive actions of the vis essentialis in the fully grown adult (e.g., in digestion), then deriving the probability that there are laws governing these actions, and finally arguing by analogy that there must be a law governing generation by epigenesis.
Haller, too, is willfully interventionist and manipulative in his experimen tation. Dissections will not suffice to give the experimenter the information she needs about the living organism, and so she must perform vivisections so that the living tissue can be manipulated in various ways.'"' We get multiple examples of this manipulation in his "Dissertation," such as the experiment of pricking the bladder of a nearly dead dog to see whether it would still contract and expel urine (Haller [1752] 1936, 682) . As another example, in a letter to Bonnet of August 25, 1765, Haller describes experiments he performed in an attempt to determine the nature of the changes that happen to the blood vessels in the niembrane surrounding the embryo in an egg in the first few days after fertilization. Specifically, he wants to determine whether these changes indi cate a new formation or merely the becoming visible of the previously invisible, and to determine this he uses a scalpel to poke at the vessels both in an early stage when they are still yellow and at the later stage when they become red with blood. By poking and moving these lines around, the color in them does not spill out of the pathways as would be Haller's experiments to identify the forces of irritability and sensibility pre suppose the existence of a specific organic structure made up out of organic material.''^ He is looking for the parts of the human body that have the capac ity to be stimulated to exhibit irritability and sensibility, and so the parts are already assumed. At least insofar as his investigation into the forces of living bodies is concerned, then, Haller's experiments are premised on the assump tion that living functions and living structure are inseparable and mutually interdependent,indeed, so much so that without the structure the functions cannot occur, and without the functions the structure cannot endure. Unless there is an organic bemg that has at least its essential parts fully integrated and connected, there will be no living function (EP 8:278). This is why genera tion (the function of bringing forth an integrated organic form) by epigenesis (the gradual formation and integration of organic structure, part after part) is epistemically impossible.''^ In claiming this, he is echoing a misgiving that Harvey himself has about his own theory of generation by epigenesis. It is a "paradox," Harvey admits, that "the body is nourished and increased before the organs dedicated to concoction, namely, the stomach and the viscera, are formed" (Harvey [1651] 1981, 295) . And, again, "it seems a paradox to say that the blood is created and made to move and imbued with vital spirit before any organs for making it or giving it movement exist" (294). One way of solving the paradox is Haller's way: presuppose the essential structure by claiming that God created it because nothing natural could function prior to the structure in order to bring the structure into existence.''^ A second way of solving the paradox is Wolff's way: ask a different question. Do not ask how the vis essentialis could possibility function outside of an organic structure, but rather demonstrate that it does. Ask how (as a matter of fact) it produces the results that it does, and then reproduce the process by way of a demon strated explanation. Duchesneau perceptively identifies this divide as Wolff's departure from Haller's philosophy of organic functions in favor of a new such philosophy."*® This different philosophy of functions brings us back to theology, and we can now see the weight behind Roe's claim that God plays a much more sig nificant role in Haller's theory than he does in Wolff's. For both, God created something essential for generation at the Creation. According to Haller, God created the essential structure of each organic form together with the forces foimd within some of the matter of these structures (EP 7 :xii). For Wolff, God created the various forms of vegetative matter which account for the continu ity of species from generation to generation. For both, God must be involved to explain the regularity, order, and reasqnable variation that we experience in the living world. But for Haller, the irreducibly teleological nature of the structure requires an intentional, intelligent builder as the^ource of the useful ness of the structure. That is, his philosophy of fiinction as one that attributes usefulness for achieving certain functional goals of various structures implies the presence of an intellect, the source of which must be God, for it cannot be found in matter or forces. For Wolff, there is no such assumption about the need for structure in order to permit useful, goaldirected functions. Rather, he starts with the functioning vis essentialis and demonstrates how (in terms of process) this force can bring forth a structure withoutworrying about how the developing organism can do this minus a preexisting structure. It is enough for explanation that he has demonstrated that it does so."*^ How, then, are we to think about Roe's claim about Haller's empiricism and Wolff's rationalism? It is true that Wolff is looking for the sufficient reason by which to explain generation, but for him this amounts to a demonstration of the proximate causes of generation only. And even then it amounts to a demonstratioaonly of howthe proximate causes accomplish the task and not an investigation into their nature nor why they proceed as they do. Perhaps for this reason, Wolff claims to be searching a posteriori for the principles and laws of generation (Wolff 1759 §71 scholium 2, 38). It is true that Wolff turns to God's initial creation of the various forms of qualified vegetable Duchesneau, La physiologie des lumieres, 315. Hochdoerfer says that Haller was also influenced by the Biblical story of Creation in upholding preexistence (TVie Conflict between the Religious and the Scientific Views of Albrecht von Haller (17081777), 31) . This story provided him with a more direct reason for believing that God is needed for generation than the indirect reason suggested in the text of this paper, namely, that observations of functional organic structures indicate that there must exist an intellect responsible for that structure, an intellect for which God could be posited as the probable source. 
